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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JEREMY MICHAEL GLEESE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44329
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2016-779
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy Gleese contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
and executed his sentence in this case, or alternatively, when it did not reduce that
sentence pursuant to his I.C.R. 35 motion (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion). In either case,
he asserts the district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in the
record.

Therefore, this Court should remand this case for a new sentencing

determination by the district court, or, alternatively, reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Gleese pled guilty to burglary, and the State
agreed to dismiss a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., p.37; Tr., Vol.1, p.7,

L.22 - p.8, L.12.)1 Mr. Gleese explained that he had relapsed and begun using drugs
again, and, during that time, he had gone into a Sears store to take some tools.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.4.) At the ensuing sentencing hearing, defense counsel
noted that, despite prior rehabilitative efforts, Mr. Gleese had been unable to identify the
root cause of his issues. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, L.15 - p.10, L.10.) However, in preparation for
this sentencing hearing, Mr. Gleese participated in a mental health evaluation, during
which, he was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. (Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.46.)

As a result, “It is highly recommended that client

participate in substance abuse treatment, mental health services, and follow the
requirements of felony probation.

In order to reduce the risk of recidivism, client will

have a better outcome if he begins these services as soon as possible to start reducing
symptomology and reduce his risk for a relapse.” (PSI, p.47.)
Defense counsel added that this new diagnosis gave insight into Mr. Gleese’s
substance abuse issues as well, as his use of methamphetamine could be properly
addressed as an effort to self-medicate his symptoms of depression. (Tr., Vol.2, p.10,
Ls.12-15.) Defense counsel also argued that simply executing a sentence would only
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The transcripts in this case are provided in three independently bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, the volume containing the transcript of the change of plea
hearing held on March 4, 2016, will be referred to as “Vol.1.” The volume containing the
transcript of the sentencing hearing held on May 27, 2016, will be referred to as “Vol.2,”
and the volume containing the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing held on July 1, 2016,
will be referred to as “Vol.3.”

2

perpetuate the cycle Mr. Gleese was already in. (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, L.22 - p.11, L.1.)
Therefore, defense counsel recommended the district court impose a rehabilitationfocused sentence, either by suspending the sentence for a period of probation, or
alternatively, by retaining jurisdiction.2 (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.1-10.)
The district court acknowledged Mr. Gleese’s mental health issues and
expressed a desire to see him rehabilitate. (Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.9-19, p.15, Ls.12-23.)
However, it also acknowledged Mr. Gleese criminal history, and pointed out that he had
only been on parole a few months before he was back into his same habits.3 (Tr., Vol.2,
p.13, Ls.6-8, 19-25.)

As such, the district court imposed and executed a unified

sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, Ls.12-13; R., pp.49-50.)
The district court explained it hoped the sentence would promote Mr. Gleese’s
rehabilitation by providing a long period of forced sobriety. (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, Ls.15-16.)
Mr. Gleese subsequently filed a timely Rule 35 motion. (R., p.52.) At a hearing
on that motion, he explained he had been evaluated for a treatment program in prison,
but had not yet begun receiving that treatment.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.7, Ls.1-8.)

He also

explained that, if paroled, he would be able to live with his girlfriend and he had an
employment opportunity available to him. (Tr., Vol.3, p.7, L.19 - p.8, L.7.) Therefore, he
requested the district court modify his sentence to a unified term of five years, with only
one year fixed, so as to provide the opportunity to get treatment in a timelier manner.
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Defense counsel acknowledged that Mr. Gleese had previously participated in two
rider programs, but explained neither program had the benefit of Mr. Gleese’s mental
health diagnosis in crafting a treatment plan. (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.11-12.)
3
The Department of Correction’s website indicates Mr. Gleese’s parole has also been
revoked. (See also Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.4-6 (the prosecutor anticipating a parole violation
would follow the resolution of the instant case).) However, the cases in which
Mr. Gleese was on parole are not on appeal here.
3

(Tr., Vol.3, p.7, Ls.9-11, p.8, L.21.) The district court denied that motion, explaining it
felt the sentence as imposed was still appropriate and believed Mr. Gleese would be
getting treatment “sooner than you think.” (Tr., Vol.3, p.11, Ls.3-11; R., p.73.)
Mr. Gleese filed a notice of appeal timely from the Judgment of Conviction.
(R., pp.49, 60.)
ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed
Mr. Gleese’s sentence.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Gleese’s Rule
35 motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Gleese’s
Sentence
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest.
(Ct. App. 1982).

See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772

In order to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s

sentencing decision, the defendant must show, in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997). The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of
society is the primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124
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Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that

rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal
sanction.” State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as
stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
In this case, while the district court acknowledged a desire to see Mr. Gleese
rehabilitate, it imposed a sentence which did not most effectively serve that goal. As a
result, it imposed a sentence which also failed to effectively serve the primary objective
of protection of society.

The mental health evaluator’s treatment recommendation

summarizes the interplay of these two goals, as well as the best means to achieve
them, in Mr. Gleese’s case:

“It is highly recommended that client participate in

substance abuse treatment, mental health services, and follow the requirements of
felony probation.

In order to reduce the risk of recidivism, client will have a better

outcome if he begins these services as soon as possible to start reducing
symptomology and reduce his risk for a relapse.” (PSI, p.47.) In addition to explaining
why a sentence aimed at getting Mr. Gleese into rehabilitative programs which would
provide the opportunity to address the root of Mr. Gleese’s issues should have been
imposed in this case, that recommendation also demonstrates why Mr. Gleese’s
previous opportunities for rehabilitation had not been successful – they had not taken a
mental health diagnosis into account. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.11-12)
Furthermore, defense counsel explained Mr. Gleese’s participation in the mental
health evaluation “has really been an eye opening experience for him,” which has made
him, according to the mental health evaluator, “very motivated and ready for treatment.”
(Tr., Vol.2, p.9, Ls.21-25; PSI, p.45.)

Additionally, Mr. Gleese’s parents remain
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supportive and were hopeful that, with the information from the mental health
evaluation, they could help him address the root of his issues.
Ls.14-18.)

(Tr., Vol.2, p.9,

Mr. Gleese’s amenability to treatment, with the more complete

understanding of his situation and continuing familial support, corroborates the
prudence of the mental health evaluator’s recommendation: provide him timely access
to rehabilitation programs because he is more likely to successfully rehabilitate in that
scenario.
Finally, as the mental health evaluator noted (PSI, p.47), providing timely access
to rehabilitative programs will not only improve the chances for successful rehabilitation,
but also will provide more protection to society in the long term because it would reduce
the risk of a relapse. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (recognizing the
timing of rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at sentencing);
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008) (same). While the district court’s
desire to provide rehabilitation through a period of forced sobriety is notable, it does not
provide for timely access into rehabilitative programs.

As such, it is not the most

effective option to address the goals of sentencing vis-à-vis Mr. Gleese’s particular
needs.

That means the district court’s decision to execute Mr. Gleese’s sentence,

rather than suspend it or retain jurisdiction, both of which would allow Mr. Gleese
access to the necessary rehabilitative programs as soon as possible, constituted an
abuse of its discretion.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Gleese’s Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

When petitioning for a sentence

reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. “The criteria
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).
At the Rule 35 hearing, Mr. Gleese presented new information about the housing
and employment opportunities available to him if he were parole-eligible.

He also

presented additional information about the treatment program he expected he would
complete prior to release on parole. Compare State v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 949
(Ct. App. 2013) (“The judge may consider . . . any new information concerning the
defendant's rehabilitative progress in confinement” pursuant to a Rule 35 motion). The
district court’s acknowledgement that Mr. Gleese should be getting that treatment
“sooner than you think” (Tr., Vol.3, p.11, Ls.3-11) actually demonstrates it had not
sufficiently considered the information provided by the mental health evaluator – that
Mr. Gleese should get that treatment “as soon as possible” to better prevent a relapse
down the line. (PSI, p.47.) The hope that Mr. Gleese might get treatment soon does
not, as discussed in Section I, supra, provide the soonest possible access to treatment
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programs.

Therefore, for reasons discussed in Section I, supra, the district court

abused its discretion by not reducing Mr. Gleese’s sentence, such that he would be
immediately parole-eligible and be able to enter that treatment program as soon as
possible.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gleese respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to the district
court for a new sentencing determination. Alternatively, he requests that this Court
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 21st day of November, 2016.

____/S/_____________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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